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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
lJ * * * * * * * 
JACK HORGAN, ) 
lJ ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) Case No. 18104 
vs. ) 
) 
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN CORPORATION, ) 
a Utah Corporation, ABE w. ) 
MATHEWS ENGINEERING CORPORA- ) 
TION, a Minnesota Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents.) 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages for 
an alleged breach of an employment contract and for wrongful 
termination of employment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary 
judgment against the plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek to have the trial court's summary 
judgment affirmed. 
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QUESTION ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting 
defendants' motion for summary judgment? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as set forth by plaintiff are so selective 
as to be misleading. Therefore, defendants offer the following 
statement of facts. 
Plaintiff is an engineer and was employed by defendant 
/ 
Abe W. Mathews Engineering Corporation (hereinafter referred to 
as "Mathews") in October, 1957. Plaintiff was employed by 
Mathews until July 1, 1977, at which time he went on the pay-
roll of Industrial Design Corporation (hereinafter referred to 
as "IDC"), a subsidiary of Mathews. 
Plaintiff volunteered in October, 1976, to move from 
Hibbing, Minnesota, to Salt Lake City, Utah, to try to lend 
assistance to IDC in its business operation. (Horgan depo., p. 
13). Plaintiff's offer to transfer to Salt Lake City was offi-
cially accepted at a directors' meeting en December 17, 1976 
(Horgan depo., p. 14), and plaintiff began commuting to Salt 
Lake City in February, 1977. (Horgan depo., p. 10). Plaintiff 
u 1 t imately sold his home in Hibbing, Minnesota, and bought a 
home in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff went on the payroll of l )C 
on July 1, 1977. At the time of plaintiff's move to Salt Lake 
city, he was compensated $3,000 to help make up the difference 
between the appraised value of his home in Hibbing and the 
-2-
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actual sales price and was also paid $3,836.10 for moving 
expenses. (Horgan depo., Ex. D-3). 
Plaintiff claims that as part of his agreement to move 
to Salt Lake City, he was to have the opportunity for a stock 
option with IDC, bonuses, and the eventual presidency of !DC, 
(Horgan depo. p. 15). Plaintiff alleges that these representa-
tions amounted to an employment contract and that defendants 
breached the contract. However, plaintiff has made the follow-
ing admissions, all of which indicate that he had no employment 
contract that precluded defendants from firing plaintiff for 
cause: 
1. That he did not have a written employment con-
tract or stock option contract with Mathews or !DC (Horgan 
depo., p. 17). 
2. That the verbal discussions· about stock options 
did not progress to the point of setting a price at which the 
stock would be purchased (Horgan depo., p. 22). 
3. That any bonuses would be contingent upon the 
corporation operating at a profit (Horgan dep., p. 22). 
4. That bonuses were at the discretion at the Board 
of Directors (Horgan depo., p. 22). 
5. That Mr. James s. Robb had the right, pursuant to 
a written employment contract, to remain as president of !DC as 
long as he desired. (Horgan depo., p. 25). 
-3-
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6. That it would only be upon Mr. Robb's retirement 
and upon plaintiff's earning the presidency that he would 
become president. (Horgan depo., p. 25). 
7. That prior to moving to Salt Lake City, plaintiff 
had a discussion with one of the members of the Board of 
Directors of Mathews and told that Director that he didn't feel 
that he needed a written employment contract. (Horgan dep., p. 
18). In fact, Mathews' standard operating procedure was not to 
have employment contracts with its employees. (Mathews depo., 
p. 45). 
Because of the conflicts that existed between Mr. Robb 
and plaintiff as to plaintiff's alleged disloyalty, refusal to 
follow company policies regarding review of bids and other 
matters, and inability to produce sales (Robb depo., p. 12-34), 
plaintiff either quit or was terminated from IDC effective June 
30, 1978. 
During the course of events leading up to his termina-
tion, plaintiff told Jack H. De Luca ("De Luca"), president of 
Mathews, that "either Jim Robb has to go or I have to go." 
When reminded that Mr. Robb had an employment contract for as 
long as he desired, plaintiff said, "Well, then I'd better get 
out of here." (DeLuca depo., p. 33). Plaintiff admits that "I 
might have said that. n (Horgan depo. I p. 44). At that time, 
plaintiff was offered a transfer back to Hibbing, Minnesota, to 
work for Mathews but refused the same (Horgan depo., p. 78, 
-4-
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DeLuca depo., p. 30, and Abe W. Mathews depo., p. 46). Plain-
tiff states that he felt the defendants were not sincere in 
this offer {Horgan depo., p. 78). 
Upon termination, plaintiff received the following 
considerations: 
1. For repurchase of his Mathews stock, the sum of 
$123,200 based on $1600 per share for 77 shares. 
2. Lump sum distribution from Mathews profit sharing 
plan in the amount of $16,338.04. 
3. Distribution from IDC profit sharing plan in the 
amount of $200.00. 
4. A bonus from IDC in the amount of $170.00. 
5. Three months' termination pay from Mathews in the 
sum of $10,200.00. 
6. vacation pay from IDC in the amount of $3,400.00. 
7. IDC paid $720 for six months' premiums for group 
health insurance coverage for plaintiff's family. 
8. Plaintiff also received the cash value of a life 
insurance policy. 
All of the foregoing is evidenced by a letter dated 
June 27, 1978, from DeLuca to plaintiff (Horgan depo., Ex. 
D-4.) That letter made reference to plaintiff's "voluntary 
termination." By letter dated August 11, 1978, plaintiff 
requested that "voluntary termination" be changed to •involun-
tary termination". {Horgan depo., Ex. D-6). At plaintiff's 
-5-
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request, DeLuca wrote a letter dated August 28, 1978, stating 
that the termination was involuntary and also that his services 
would be retained as an independent consultant for a period of 
three months at $3,400.00 per month. (Horgan depo., Ex. D-8). 
This letter was written using the designation "involuntary ter-
mination" and set forth the arrangement for consulting fees as 
an accommodation to plaintiff to assist him in collecting 
unemployment insurance payments (Horgan depo., p. 7 3) and so 
that the payments would not be subject to income tax withhold-
ing and Social Security taxes (DeLuca depo., p. 39). 
As to the termination pay, plaintiff claims that he 
had a right to this termination pay because it had been paid to 
other employees (Horgan depo., p. 68). However, DeLuca testi-
fied that there was no such company policy and that termination 
pay, up to that time, had only been paid on one previous occa-
sion. (DeLuca depo., p. 39). With regard to health insurance, 
plaintiff claims that the premiums were paid for six months 
because defendants knew that plaintiff's family was uninsurable 
(Horgan depo., p. 68). The premiums amounted to $720.00 
(Horgan depo., p. 70), but were in fact worth much more than 
that because plaintiff's family was uninsurable as a result of 
a handicapped child. 
Plaintiff and Mathews entered into a Mutual Release on 
August 28, 1978, wherein plaintiff waived 
-6-
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• . . any and all rights or claims of what-
ever nature, past, present or future, which 
have accrued or which would accrue by reason 
of the employment relationship and hereby 
releases Employer from any and all obliga-
tions and liabilities arising under, inci-
dent to, or by virtue of the employment 
relationship, and as a stockholder and 
director of Employer. 
(Horgan depo., Ex. D-7). 
Plaintiff admits that he read the Mutual Release, 
understood that it was a release of all claims, and "wanted to 
get it over with." (Horgan depo., p. 72). Plaintiff further 
admits that at about the time of signing the Mutual Release he 
considered consul ting an attorney. In fact, plaintiff called 
William L. Crawford, attorney for defendant, and was referred 
to another attorney but plaintiff chose not to consult with the 
attorney because he "wanted to get it behind me as soon as 
possible." (Horgan depo., p. 77). 
Horgan alleges that he signed the Mutual Release under 
emotional distress stemming from the fact that he had lost his 
job. (Horgan depo., p 72). He also alleges that he was under 
duress as a result of a letter he received f rorn Mathews stating 
that his termination pay would be held up because he was con-
templating legal action against Mathews. (Horgan depo., p. 87; 
Ex. P-1) • However, this allegation is rneritless since the 
letter clearly stated that the termination pay would not be 
9aid until the manner in which the payment was to be made for 
the stock was decided. It did not state that the termination 
-7-
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pay would be withheld if plaintiff consulted an attorney or if 
he did not sign the release. DeLuca stated that the intent of 
the letter authored by him was to indicate that he wanted to 
know the terms of payment for the stock before the termination 
pay would be paid. (DeLuca depo., p. 49). 
Defendants maintain that they were exceedingly fair to 
plaintiff upon the termination in paying him a premium of 
$4,543 for his Mathews stock ($1600 per share less $1541 per 
share book value--see Mathews depo. p. 40), $10,200 in terrnina-
tion pay, maintaining health insurance as aforesaid, etc. 
After the settlement was reached, plaintiff also felt that he 
had been treated justly, equitably and held no animosity. 
(Horgan deposition p. 75). In fact, plaintiff wrote DeLuca a 
letter dated September 7, 1978, wherein he stated that he 
appreciated the prompt handling of some of the details of his 
termination and further stated: 
I feel that you have been just and equitable 
in this final settlement. I hold no ani-
mosity towards AWMECO [Mathews] since I also 
helped make the company what it is today. 
Hence I will always remember the good 
people, fun and disappointments of building 
a business as a most rewarding experience. 
(Horgan depo., Ex. D-9). 
After January 31, 1979, when the final payme.: .. ts were 
made under the settlement agreement, there was no further con-
tact by plaintiff with Mathews. Plaintiff made no demands for 
additional compensation until he filed suit on May 19, 1980. 
(Horgan depo. p. 76). 
-8-
I Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS SINCE NO GENUINE 
ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS WITH RESPECT TO PLAIN-
TIFF'S VOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT. 
As stated above, based upon the depositions of DeLuca, 
plaintiff, and Mathews, plaintiff was given the opportunity at 
the time of his termination of employment with IDC to transfer 
back to Hibbing, Minnesota, and to work for Mathews. Plaintiff 
admits that the offer of transfer was made, but felt that the 
defendants were not sincere in their offer. However, Abe W. 
Mathews, Chairman of the Board of Directors and majority stock 
holder in Abe W. Mathews Eng·ineering Company, testified that 
the offer was a sincere offer and that Mathews would have taken 
plaintiff back if plaintiff had wanted to transfer back to 
Hibbing, Minnesota. Thus, it appears from the record that 
plaintiff, rather than accepting a transfer, voluntarily ter-
minated his employment in spite of the fact that some of the 
documents refer to an involuntary termination. The fact that 
an employee is not entitled to damages for wrongful termination 
for breach of contract if he in fact quits his employment is so 
apparent and clear cut that it requires no citation of legal 
authority to substantiate the same. Thus, the trial court 
could have properly found no cause of action on the basis of 
plaintiff's voluntary termination. 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS SINCE PLAINTIFF WAS 
AN EMPLOYEE AT WILL AND THUS, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, HAS NO RIGHT TO COMPENSATION HE WOULD 
HAVE RECEIVED HAD HE NOT BEEN DISCHARGED. 
As stated above, plaintiff did not have a written or 
oral employment contract with defendants, or either of them, 
whereby defendants were required to retain plaintiff for any 
particular time. At the time the plaintiff volunteered to come 
to Salt Lake City, he had an oral agreement that provided, in 
pertinent part, that he would receive the same compensation 
that he received in Hibbing, that if things worked out he might 
eventually receive bonuses, that he might also receive the 
right to purchase stock at a future date, and that at a future 
date he might have the opportunity to become president of IDC. 
However, plaintiff had no written or oral contract that he 
would be employed for any definite period of time. On the con-
trary, plaintiff knew when he transferred to Salt Lake City 
that his continued employment, bonuses, stock options, and 
eventual presidency of the company would depend upon his per-
formance. Because of the nature of the oral agreement, it 
being indefinite as to its terms, defendants submit that they 
had an unconditional and unrestricted right to fire or dis-
charge plaintiff because of the conflicts that arose between 
plaintiff and the president of the company. The case of Bihl-
maier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah, 1979) is quite similar to 
-10-
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the case at hand. In that case the plaintiff quit one job and 
moved to Utah with the expectation that if things worked out he 
would become store manager. He was hired for a trial period 
and his assumption of managerial duties would depend upon his 
performance. Because of a dispute with defendant, plaintiff 
quit and sued for damages for an alleged breach of oral employ-
men t con tr act. The Trial Court granted summary judgment for 
defendant and this Court affirmed stating: 
[I]n the absence of some further express or 
implied stipulation as to the duration of 
the employment or of a good consideration in 
addition to the services contracted to be 
rendered, the contract is no more than an 
indefinite general hiring which is termin-
able at the will of either party .•. 
When an individual is hired for an indefin-
ite time, he has no right of action against 
his employer for breach of employment con-
tract upon being discharged. 
(Id. 792). 
Similary, in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, 
Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960), this Court affirmed 
the granting of a summary judgment for the employer on the 
u 
ground that the employee did not have a contract for a definite 
period of time. The Court also held that the fact that plain-
tiff had the right to purchase stock within a specified period 
of time if he were still employed, that he quit a job and took 
a pay cut in order to work for defendant, that he moved to Utah 
at his expense, and that he lost other benefits, did not give 
rise to an implication that he was employed for some definite 
period of time. Id. at 6, 354 P.2d at 562. 
-11-
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT SINCE NO GENUINE ISSUE 
OF FACT EXIST WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY 
OF THE RELEASE EXECUTED BY PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff and Mathews entered into a Mutual Release 
dated August 28, 1978. This Release purported to be a Mutual 
Release of all claims that plaintiff and Mathews had against 
each other. This Release was executed by plaintiff in con-
sideration of the payments that had been received or were to be 
received from Mathews and IDC. Inasmuch as plaintiff negoti-
ated for and received $3400 in vacation pay from IDC, $170 in 
bonuses from IDC, $200 in profit sharing contributions from 
IDC, and six months of premium payments on health insurance 
from IDC, and since IDC is a subsidiary of Mathews, the Mutual 
Release must be construed to be a release of not only Mathews 
but also of IDC. 
It is significant that after the Mutual Release was 
signed in August, 1978, plaintiff wrote a letter to DeLuca, 
part of which is quoted above in the Statement of Facts, stat-
ing that he felt the settlement was just and equitable and that 
he held no animosity towards the Company. (Horgan depo., Ex. 
D-9.) Because of plaintiff's satisfaction with the settlement 
and because of the Mutual Release, plaintiff should not now be 
allowed to repudiate said agreement and make additional claims 
against defendants as he is attempting to do. 
-12-
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In an attempt to avoid the consequences of the Mutual 
Release, plaintiff alleges that it is invalid because he exe-
cuted it under duress. This bald allegation does not preclude 
the granting of summary judgment for defendant since plaintiff 
admitted during his deposition that his emotional distress 
resulted from the fact that he had lost his job and that his 
child was about to undergo major surgery. 
the type of duress that should excuse 
This is clearly not 
plaintiff from the 
Release. With respect to the first basis, the duress experi-
enced by plaintiff is no more than that experienced by every 
discharged employee. Recognition of plaintiff's argument would 
cast doubt on the validity of all Releases executed by dis-
charged employees and would thereby hinder the voluntary 
settlement of such dispute. Since settlements are to be 
encouraged, plaintiff's first argument must be rejected as a 
matter of law. With respect to the plaintiff's second basis 
for claiming that the Release is invalid, it should suffice to 
say that, although the child's medical problem probably did 
cause plaintiff some emotional distress, the distress was in no 
way caused by defendants and therefore cannot provide a basis 
for evading the terms of the Release. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court properly granted Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment because 
( 1) Pl a.int iff quit his employment rather than accept 
a transfer for Hibbing, Minnesota, 
-13-
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(2) plaintiff did not have an employment agreement 
whereby defendants were obligated to employ him for a definite 
period of time and defendants were justified in discharging 
plaintiff at any time for any reason, and 
(3) plaintiff has given defendants his Mutual Release. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the summary 
judgment entered by the trial court. 
DATED this 2nd day of March, 1982. 
Respectful ly·-)subrni t ted, 
I .1 
PARS,ON .. S'. 1'ft,1, .'EHLE &/L. A.?IM. ~,i R 
I I I / ~· I I 
,1 I Id '/fi1/l _ . r ,·I 
I //' ; ~ --/, /' -- . ._.. . / ~c.--
wi11iarn L. crhwford 
....... ~, 
,, \ I 
' :\, ~-;- ., { \.::.-~ 
Kent o. Roche 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents, Industrial Design 
and Abe W. Mathews Engineering 
Corporation 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two ( 2) copies of the 
foregoing Brief, to Henry s. Nygaard, of and for BEASLIN, 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT, attorneys for plaintiff I 1100 Boston 
Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, this nd day of March, 1982. 
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